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A Curious Call for More Judicial
Activism: Comment on Alexandra
Klein’s “The Freedom to Pursue a
Common Calling”
Mark Rush*
I. Introduction
H.L. Mencken said, “Democracy is the theory that the
common people know what they want and deserve to get it good
and hard.”1 Alexandra Klein demonstrates that while Mencken’s
impatience with democracy may be justified, his observation is
built on a fallacy: “the people” do not exist; majorities and
minorities do.
This is a foundational part of U.S. constitutional history. The
division of federal powers among three branches, the division of
national powers between the states and the federal government,
the justification for a large republic, staggered electoral terms,
and an independent judiciary with the power to declare
legislation unconstitutional are all part of a governmental
scheme designed to check the power of popular majorities.2
The same fear of tyrannical majorities that animated the
Framers also prompted the Supreme Court to subject legislation
that threatened the freedom of “discrete and insular minorities”
to a much more exacting scrutiny than it used for other
legislation.3 In United States v. Carolene Products, Justice Stone
stated this in the famous fourth footnote to his opinion of the
Court:
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1. H.L. MENCKEN, A LITTLE BOOK IN C MAJOR 19 (1916).
2. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
3. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right
to vote, on restraints upon the dissemination of information,
on interferences with political organizations, as to prohibition
of peaceable assembly.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or racial
minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.4

But Carolene Products signaled a surrender by the Court. It
would no longer subject economic rights to the same strict
scrutiny that it continued to employ when dealing with discrete
and insular minorities and more fundamental rights such as
those noted in footnote four.5 Working from the assumption that
economic legislation affected rich and poor alike and, therefore,
the political process would resolve any controversies regarding
such laws, the Court retreated from imposing anything more
than “rational basis” review on economic legislation.6
While this may have made sense in 1938, Alexandra Klein
argues that it no longer does so. She demonstrates that the
economic marketplace does indeed generate discrete and insular
minorities. The market is neither fair nor efficient. It is as subject
4. Id. (citations omitted).
5. See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 125
(2010).
6. See id. at 153 (“[L]egislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.”).
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to domination by special interests akin to the factions Madison
feared in Federalist 10 as the political marketplace. Economic
rights, she argues, are no less important than the other
“fundamental” rights outlined by Justice Stone. Insofar as the
economic marketplace is unjust, the Court can no longer justify
treating challenges to economic regulations with the “kid gloves”
of rational basis review.
II. The Evidence
In focusing on occupational licensing schemes, Klein
brilliantly uses what may seem to be very local or arcane issues
to demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the Court’s approach to
states’ rights, the federal division of powers, and economic
freedoms. There is, as she notes, something peculiarly wrong in
the political and economic system if it can take longer to become a
pet groomer than it does to become an emergency medical
technician. There also is something awry when the standards for
getting licensed in particular professions can vary radically from
state to state.7
Even if one is a staunch defender of the federal structure of
the United States’ constitutional system, it is hard to justify
radical interstate differences in licensing requirements for the
same profession. While the differences in or unique aspects of
local topography and climate may render it inefficient to
administer land use or waterways with a one size fits all policy
emanating from Washington, it is hard to believe that toenails,
hair, and pets (not to mention dentistry or heart surgery) vary
much from state to state.8 Defenders of federalism can seek
refuge in romantic notions of states’ rights, traditional state
functions, and romantic, Tocquevillian notions of states as
“laboratories of democracy.”9 But those laboratories of innovation
7. See generally Alexandra Klein, The Freedom to Pursue a Common
Calling: Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (2016); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and
Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209 (2016).
8. Klein, supra note 7, at 414–15 n.14–22.
9. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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and progress have had a less romantic history as barriers to
interstate commerce10 and backwaters of clientelism and
discrimination.
Klein argues that there is a clear justification for states to
impose licensing schemes to ensure the integrity of professions,
quality of services, and to protect the public interest. No one
would doubt the need to ensure that surgeons are licensed. But
she argues that special interests have captured state legislatures
and transformed licensing schemes from mechanisms to protect
the public interest at the expense of private interests to perverse
practices that protect private interests at the expense of the
public.11 The result, she argues, is a debasement of the individual
right to pursue a common calling.
III. A Common Calling
We see this right first alluded to in Corfield v. Coryell.12
There, Justice Bushrod Washington asserted that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause13 includes “the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole.”14 From this, the court concluded that “the pursuit of a

10. See generally S.C. State Highway Dep’t. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S.
177 (1938) (allowing state action to burden interstate commerce through state
regulations on weight and width of trucks on state highways); S. Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (noting that a state regulation on railroad
transportation interfered with the Commerce Clause).
11. See Larkin, supra note 7, at 235
Where does that leave us? With this remarkable irony. The
justification for regulation has come full circle. Originally, the
rationale was that government intervention would remedy economic
market failures in furtherance of the public interest. Today, we see
that government intervention causes political market failures in
furtherance of private interests. Government has become the
problem, not the solution.
12. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
14. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552–53.
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common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges
protected by the Clause.”15
Despite Washington’s broad definition of economic rights and
his extraction of a right to pursue a common calling from the
general wording of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
court—and Washington—nevertheless upheld New Jersey’s
prohibition against out-of-staters harvesting oysters and clams
because the creatures were common property of New Jersey
citizens.16 It seemed that the right to a common calling could stop
at a state line. State lines ultimately yielded to the fundamental
right to travel in decisions such as Edwards v. California17 and
Saenz v. Roe.18 But the scope and definition of the right to a
common calling remained somewhat nebulous.
The right to pursue a common calling or honest living is not
sui generis. It depends on a state power to differentiate between
legal and illegal means of making a living. The Court upheld a
state’s power to make this differentiation when it sustained
Kansas’s prohibition of debt adjustment in Ferguson v. Skrupa.19
In leaving this authority to the states, the Court maintained:
We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation, and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time
when courts used the Due Process Clause to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.20

Thus, Klein seems to be on the horns of a dilemma. The right
she wishes to protect (common calling) is the creation of the same
legislative power that creates the occupational licensing schemes
that she wants to regulate. This is the same power that lets
states decide whether or not to permit alcohol, prostitution, and
15. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 219 (1984).
16. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552 (“[I]t would, in our opinion, be going quite
too far to construe the grant of privileges and immunities of citizens, as
amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in the common property of the state, to the
citizens of all the other states.”).
17. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
18. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
19. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
20. Id. at 731–32.
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the use of marijuana. If we trust a state with such powers, why
do we withdraw that trust when it comes to licensing fortune
tellers?
As Klein points out, this conundrum lies at the intersection
of public choice theory and constitutional law. Political processes
and markets will inevitably be captured by small, powerful
groups that exert disproportionate influence and can therefore
extract rents from the political process at the expense of the
general public and, one would argue, the common good.21
Accordingly, Klein demonstrates that we should trust courts to
police the economic marketplace in the same way that John Hart
Ely called upon them to police the political marketplace in
Democracy and Distrust.22 As a result, Klein eloquently argues
that economic rights should no longer be granted second-class
status.
IV. Back to the Future? The Primacy of Economic Rights
In this respect, she touches upon one of the issues that the
Founders regarded as most compelling: the protection of property
and markets. It is not often noted that the First Amendment is
actually the second mention of rights in the Constitution. As a
result of the economic and political chaos under the Articles of
Confederation, the Framers were so concerned with property
rights and their security23 that they wrote Article I, section 10,
which reads in part:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.24
21. Klein cites numerous sources. Klein, supra note 7, at 437–41. To hers, I
add MANCUR OLSEN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1984); ANTHONY DOWNS,
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS:
THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1995).
22. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
23. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2004).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

A CURIOUS CALL FOR MORE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

483

While the Bill of Rights was designed to constrain the Federal
Government, Article I, § 10 took dead aim at the states and, in
particular, their electoral majorities. It protects the freedom to do
what we will with our labor and our property. By protecting
contracts and forbidding ex post facto laws, it prevents the state
legislative majorities from attacking capital. The rationale was
made manifest in Federalist 44 where Madison celebrated the
Contract Clause:
No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . [Such laws] are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to
every principle of sound legislation . . . .
Our own experience has taught us, that additional fences
against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly,
therefore, have the convention added this constitutional
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights. The
sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy
which has directed the public councils. They have seen with
regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative
interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and
snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the
community. They have seen too, that one legislative
interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions,
every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the
effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that
some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish
speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence
and industry, and give a regular course to the business of
society.25

But, this economic liberty was never unlimited.
Shortly after Justice Washington celebrated the right to
pursue a common calling in Corfield, Justice Taney offered an
extraordinarily circumspect observation about the nature of
individual rights: they and their enforcement depend upon the
prior and ongoing existence of a public interest. In Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge,26 he asserted:
The object and end of all government is to promote the
happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is
25.
26.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
36 U.S. 420 (1837).
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established, and it can never be assumed, that the government
intended to diminish its powers of accomplishing the end for
which it was created . . . . The whole community . . . have a
right to require that the power of promoting their comfort and
convenience, and of advancing the public prosperity . . . shall
not be considered to have been surrendered or diminished by
the state unless it shall appear by plain words, that it was
intended . . . . While the rights of private property are sacredly
guarded, we must not forget that the community also has
rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen
depends on their faithful preservation.27

So, even though Harvard had secured from the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts what it thought was a monopoly to ferry people
across the Charles River, and even though the Charles River
Bridge Company had been guaranteed to inherit that right and
operate as a monopoly for another decade or so when it was
incorporated, the Court declared that the people of
Massachusetts could override their contractual obligations and
incorporate a rival bridge company.
A century later, Chief Justice Hughes reasserted this vision
of individual rights—and the need for the state to regulate the
economic as well as political marketplace—in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish.28 In sustaining Washington State’s minimum wage laws
and other restrictions on women’s employment, Justice Hughes
stated that the exercise of rights presupposes a state power that
can protect their exercise by restricting it. He explained that,
“Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity
from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the
interests of the community.”29 Accordingly, Hughes argued that
the Court had to take into account the context in which workers
sought to exercise their rights and the inequality of power among
actors in the political and economic marketplace:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and thus are
relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage . . . is

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 547–48.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 392.
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not only detrimental to their health and well-being, but casts a
direct burden for their support on the community.30

The New Deal Court, which established tiers of scrutiny in
Carolene Products also asserted the need to maintain equitable
market conditions to protect economic actors. Klein finds herself
in a peculiar situation: she agrees with the same court with
which she disagrees.
V. Conclusion: Judicial Review and Imperfect Democracy
A minority that suffers discrimination is discrete and
insular—regardless of whether the right at stake is property,
contract, speech, or religion. The decision in Carolene Products to
create tiers of scrutiny and hierarchies of rights was a judicial
prophylactic that enabled the Court to extract itself from the
quagmire of reviewing economic legislation while remaining
vigilant and active with regard to political equality. The time has
come, says Klein, to revisit and perhaps dispense with this
prophylactic.
Klein’s logic in this respect, is as unassailable as it is
earthshaking. Her analysis is nothing less than a call for a
constitutional or federal revolution and a remarkable increase in
judicial activism. With regard to federalism, what Klein calls for
is a reassertion of the principles that animated much of the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence: the states
could not balkanize the national economy. With regard to
property or economic rights, she calls for a resuscitation of the
principles that underpinned Lochner v. New York:31 the Court
cannot simply turn a blind eye to the rent-seeking behavior that
permeates politics. But, are we prepared to give the judiciary the
final say regarding the necessity and rationality of licensing
schemes—or any other legislation?
Judges are not experts in economic or other professional
regulation. They are trained as lawyers—not as pet groomers,
land use regulators, or surgeons. As a result, it has become
manifest that the courts struggle to analyze or offer informed
30.
31.

Id. at 399.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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judgments about scientific, professional or other “expert”
testimony dealing with the intricacies of particular legislation. 32
With regard to policing the democratic process, the courts are
not necessarily any more competent to discern whether it is
functioning properly or improperly than they are to assess
licensing schemes. Insofar as the legislative process is iterative
and dynamic, it may be the case that a law that seems to
persecute a discrete or insular minority may be a necessary step
in an attenuated legislative process designed to bring about a
more just political system.33 If so, is the primary justification for
judicial interference simply to speed the political process up?
So, we find ourselves still stuck in our conundrum. If the
legislature is corrupt, but the courts are not particularly
competent, what is a citizen or scholar to do?
VI. The Case for a More Activist Court: Constitutional Confidence
Regardless of the pitfalls of calling for more judicial activism,
Klein’s case is firmly grounded in sound principles. The
marketplace metaphor applies as well to politics as it does to
economics.34 A strong, but messy, case can be made for more
judicial oversight of both despite the limits to judicial knowledge
and the impact of judicial review on the democratic deliberative
process.
If we do seek more judicial activism in the name of interstate
consistency and a better protection of fundamental rights, then
consistency would dictate that the court protect all rights equally.
If so, this certainly justifies the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges.35 Certainly, if it is unconscionable for
32. See generally Gatowski, et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV., 433–58; David Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2000); David Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and
the Birth of Modernity, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2013).
33. See generally CHRISTOPHER MANFREDI & MARK RUSH, JUDGING
DEMOCRACY (2008).
34. See generally Samuel Issaccharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643
(1998).
35. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

A CURIOUS CALL FOR MORE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

487

licensed hairdressers, dog groomers, dentists, and fortune-tellers
to navigate an irrational web of ad hoc and unjustified
occupational licensing schemes from one state to the next, then it
stands to reason that spouses in same-sex marriages also ought
to be protected from the balkanization of marriage law.
If we are concerned with the integrity and efficiency of
political as well as economic marketplaces, then there is much to
be said for an activist judiciary. But there are equally powerful
arguments against. As Justice Roberts noted in dissent in
Obergefell:
The majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits
even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its desire to
remake society according to its own “new insight” into the
“nature of injustice.” . . . As a result, the Court invalidates the
marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the
transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis
of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and
the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who
do we think we are?36

Roberts laments judicial action. But, per Klein’s analysis,
inaction has an equal but opposite effect. If the economic or
political marketplace is malfunctioning, how can the Court turn a
blind eye and simply defer to a romantic, but inaccurate vision of
deliberative democracy that ignores the realities of public choice
theory? If Roberts’s assessment of the democratic process is
accurate, then he and critics of judicial activism can easily find
solace in the structure of the constitutional system. In response to
a judicial decision, a legislature may look to pass another law and
thereby engage in a constitutional dialogue with the Court.37 The
constitutional system envisions a democracy that is driven by
clashes among the three branches.38 Perhaps a more activist
Court would force the elected branches to respond to its decisions
and, in so doing, reinvigorate American democracy.
36. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
37. See generally LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2d ed. 2015).
38. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).

